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Synopsis:
"Ever have one of those days where you'd like to slap the ever loving bat snot out of a patient who is
just being a jerk because they can? Nurses shouldn't have to take abuse from you just because you are
sick. In fact, it makes me less motivated to make sure your call light gets answered every time when I
know that the minute I step in the door I'll be greeted by a deluge of insults." January 29 th , 2013 12:00
a.m. Via Facebook.
This was the Facebook post that cost me my job, my reputation, and ultimately my career. It
was stupid, I will admit, to phrase it the way I did. I was trying to be sarcastic in expressing frustration,
and at midnight after a long shift I may have missed the mark. I bad no qualms about posting this at the
time, especially since I had witnessed verbal abuse and harassment from my employer due to my status
as a "male nurse" and had heard much worse treatment of people to their faces by BRP management. I
wasn't aware that their skin was so thin. However, my employer used this post as an opportunity to
accuse me of threatening every single resident under my care. Not even one week earlier I had
witnessed my employer send an irate nurse home because she considered that nurse a threat to a patient
and was afraid she'd say or do something that would get her in trouble. There was no reprimand, there

2

was no report to the Board of Nursing, and there was no judgment passed on the nurse in question.
She was welcomed back to work by her friends in management. I merely used sarcasm outside of
work, in a forum over which they have no right to intervene, and speaking of nobody in specific. I
adhered to all aspects ofHIPAA and I harmed absolutely nobody. The disproportionate response I
received shocked me beyond description. I was merely venting, not threatening, as I think any
objective reader should see. In exhibit 5 page 1 the director for employee services Matthew K. Phillips
notes the following "The law now offers employees a great deal of protection in expressing frustration
with their working conditions not only verbally, but through online venues as well." They knew that this
was not something that I had to be fired for, yet decided to stretch the definition of a threat to the point
where something this ridiculous fit.
I had no malice in my heart, nor bad intentions for the people under my care, I was simply
frustrated by the usual stress of long term care nursing. I logged on to Facebook and used the
community setting to vent my frustration, leading to the statement in question that resulted in my firing. I
had often used Facebook as a place to vent my frustrations, since a large portion of my friends were
nurses and provided feedback that I found helpful. Had I known that my post was offensive, or that
some would consider it an inappropriate threat to my residents, I never would have written it. My
understanding of the rules of sharing what happens at work were limited to HIPPA vio lations, in that the
sharing of protected health information with anyone outside of the clinical team involved directly with the
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patient's care. I had never been told that my employer was allowed to fire me for a simple posting on
Facebook, I had never been shown the policy in question, and I was completely surprised by the out of
the blue way in which I was fired. I applied for unemployment and the first ruling came down in my
favor. I was allowed unemployment benefits on the basis that I had not been given any warning and that
the supposed infraction was a "good faith error in judgment" not a willful disregard of the rules as my
employer was suggesting. The appeal to the Idaho Industrial Commission however, found that I simply
"should have known" that it was not allowed, and the decision was reversed. I am more than a little
frustrated by this entire process. First I am told that I qualify for benefits, then I am told, 4 months after
receiving the benefits, that I should not have been approved in the first place and that I was going to
have to pay the money back. This is ridiculous. The fact that the Idaho Supreme Court must be called
in to play to discuss something so trivial is beyond a waste. It is an abuse of the system for the benefit
of the state government so that they may appear "business friendly." I present the follow evidence from
existing documents related to the case to prove my point.
1.

In the original decision by judge Shelton (p. 3) it was stated that the employer must prove by a
"preponderance of evidence" that the employee was discharged for employment related
misconduct.
a. Apparently the Idaho Industrial Commission considers a single signature obtained under
questionable circumstances a "preponderance" of evidence. They themselves set up the

4

standard in their reversal of benefits notice (p. 14), when they say the following; "an
employer's expectations are ordinarily reasonable only where they have been
communicated to the employee."
b. The social media policy was never communicated to me at any point in my employment
at Desert View Care Center.
i. During the audio recording of the initial hearing with Judge Shelton I stated that I
remembered a meeting where the policy in question had been discussed, but
that I did not remember anything at all about the Facebook part of the policy. I
also stated that I thought they had us sign the policy that day. However, I was
wrong. I did not even realize at that time that the signature page the facility was
using (exhibit 5 p. 8) as their evidence was actually the signature page from
when they passed out our paychecks. It was not until I sat down to begin work
on the motion to reconsider to Idaho Industrial Commission that I realized that
this was actually what I had signed. I NEVER knew, in the six months I was
employed there, that I was signing for more than my paycheck. They NEVER
told us that, they simply had everybody show up at 2 pm on the lOth of every
month and line up. Then they pushed us through a room as fast as possible and
said "sign here for your paycheck."
ii. Is this really the legal standard for a "preponderance of evidence?" I don't
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think so.
2.

Although the judge did agree that the facility did have the right to discharge me for any reason
they cared to name, she also noted that the Idaho Security Law provides that an isolated act or
good faith error in judgment is not considered misconduct, and cannot be used as justification to
deny unemployment benefits. (p.3)
a. My former employer insists that this is "more than just a good faith error in judgment.(p.
6)" They make the claim that it was willful disregard of facility policy and that their
underhanded method of obtaining signatures via small print and hurried hit and run
signings on pay day constitutes reasonable communication.
b. Even if this is a "preponderance" of evidence, which it is obviously not. It does not
address the second half of this clause, the "isolated act." I have never threatened
anyone, I have never knowingly violated the policy of any company I have worked for,
even BRP. This is an isolated good faith error in judgment. It is one I had never made
before and I will never make again, and according to the Idaho Security Law, that
means I qualify for unemployment benefits.

3. The Idaho Industrial Commission, in their Decision and Order (p. 16), claims that I
acknowledged having read and signed the "Social and Electronic Media Policy." That was
when I was thinking of the policy that they had us sign in a meeting referring to the use of cell
phones on facility property. They did not mention the "Social and Electronic Media Policy" in
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that meeting, therefore that is ilTelevant. You will note that in Exhibit 5, p. 8 where they pull this
assumption from, the facility presents as evidence the notification of policy that they had
everyone sign when they picked up their paychecks in a hUlTY on the way to get groceries. The
Idaho Industrial Commission was simply incorrect in their assumption that I acknowledged
reading the policy. I never read it, I was never presented it, and I it was never sufficiently
communicated to me. Had that been done it simply would not have happened.
4. The Idaho Industrial Commission notes in page 4 (p. 16) of the Decision and order that an
employee can only be held accountable for breaching those expectations that he or she
understood. Then they contradict themselves later on in the same page when they say that I
"should have realized," that what I said was over the line. Well which is it? Is the legal standard
that I "should have" known which condemns me regardless of what I knew, or that I
"understood" that I was in violation of the policy, which is the stated legal standard. Basically
they are saying that I am in the wrong either way. They seem to acquiesce to my assertion that I
did not know, then they contradict the legal requirement by stating that I simply "should have."
So they are basically asserting that because the employer in this situation is a business they are
going to side with them no matter what, and hope that I will simply bow to their superior legal
opinion.

5. To finish I would like to present a list of points brought up by Judge Shelton in her original
decision and order that the Idaho Industrial Commission, and in fact, DID NOT ADRESS AT
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a. The original decision page 3 of5 found that the policy was "Vague in regards to
Facebook," and notices as well that "claimant does not mention the name of the facility
or the patient." The Industrial Commission doesn't even address this.
b. As previously mentioned in page 3 of 5 of the original order by Judge Shelton, "an
isolated act or good faith error in judgment is not considered misconduct." The
Industrial Commission completely disregards this aspect of the Idaho Security Law, and
does not mention it a single time in their decision and order.
c. In Judge Shelton's original decision she points out the "If a party has the burden of
proof by a preponderance of the evidence, and the evidence presented weighs evenly
on both sides, the finder of fact must resolve the question against the party having the
burden of proof. Atlantic and Pacific Insurance Company vs. Barnes, 666 P2d 163
(1983)" The Idaho Industrial Commission completely ignores this pesky point of legal
precedence. In fact, they make no mention whatsoever of whether or not the facility
meets the standard of preponderance of evidence.
Conclusion:
The original decision by Judge Shelton observed all aspects of the law and gave a thorough explanation
of each aspect of her decision. The decision by the Idaho Industrial Commission reversing that order
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seems to hinge solely on one argument. That argument, namely that I "should have" known about the
policy even though it was never communicated to me, is weak at best, and does not address any legal
standards enumerated by Judge Shelton. It's as if the Idaho Industrial Commission places the burden of
preponderance of evidence on me to prove that I didn't know. This is the exact opposite of the legal
standard. Saying that I feel abused by the system in this case would be an understatement. I feel as if
the recent increase in unemployment applications, coupled with the state's desire to be "business
friendly" has created an environment where the Industrial Commission feels the need to come down on
the side of businesses regardless of the law. I have never threatened anyone, I have never broken any
law knowingly, nor have I ever disobeyed any rule to which I have willfully subjected myself, and I find
the accusations made against me by BRP to be highly offensive and malicious. They even went as far to
attempt to have the state revoke my nursing license, the way I provide food and shelter for my children!
This was a shameful attempt to cover for the original mistake of over reaction on their part. They could
have solved this entire dispute with one simple act of verification. Had they simply called and asked me
to take the posting down and showed me the policy I would have gladly done so and apologized.
Instead they chose to fire me, insult me, and destroy my career. I am disgusted, and were the cost of a
lawyer as low as the legal standards for wrongful termination suits in Idaho, we would be facing a legal
battle of a different kind. Please, end the waste of precious legal resources in Idaho and reverse the
flagrantly biased decision of the Idaho industrial commission.
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DECISION OF APPEALS EXAJv1INER

-------------------------------- )
DECISION
Benefits are ALLO"VED effective February 3, 2013. Tr'1e c1aim3.:lt was discharged but not for
misconduct in connection "Yvith the employment, as defined by § 72-1366 (5) of the Idaho
Employment Seclli"ity Law.
The Eligibility Determination dated February 27,2013 is hereby REVERSED.

HISTORY OF THE CASE
The above-entitled matter was heard by Judge Shelton, Appeals Examiner of the Idaho
Department of Labor, on Wednesday, March 27, 2013, by telephone in the City of Boise, in
accordance with §72-1368 (6) of the Idaho Employment Security Law.
The claimant was present and he provided testimony.

present and Cindy Riedel, Aclnii.llistrator, al1d Stepl:lailleBlshop: Drrector of· .

Toe ernployer ~'aS
Nursing, provided testimony.

EXl'Ubits #1 through #8 were entered into and made a pfu'i of the record of the hearing.
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ISSUE
The issue before the Appeals Examiner is whether unemployment is due to the claimant quitting
volunta.rily and, if so, whether with good cause connected with the employment -OR-being
discharged a..'ld, if so, whether for misconduct in connection with the employment, according to
§ 72-1366 (5) of the Idaho Employment Security Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT

Additional facts or testimony may exist in this case. However, the Appeals Examiner
outlines only those that are relevant to the decision and those based npon reliable evidence.
Based on the exhibits and testimony in the record, the following facts are found:
1.

The claimant was employed full time as an LPN from July 5, 2012 until February 2,
2013. The claimant's actual last day of working was January 31, 2013. Ms. Bishop was
the claimant's immediate supervisor.

2.

The employer received an e-mail from Professor Pehrson expressing concern of some
information she read on face book. The claimant posted the following: "Ever have one of
those days where you'd like to slap the ever loving bat snot out of a patient who is just
being a jerk because they ca.Tl? The claimant explahled that he .was expressing his
frustrations. The claimant would never harm a patient. He was venting.

3.

The claimant signed off on the employer's Policy: 3.2 Social and Electronic Media
Conduct of September 10, 2012. The employer's attorney sent a notice to the State
Board of Nursing. Tne c1aima.Tlt received a letter of warning from the State Board of
Nursing but did not lose his license. The claimant did not receive fu~y warnings about this
type of behavior from his employer.

4.

In the first four of the five calendar quarters preceding the one in which the claimant
applied for benefits, t.1Jis employer paid the claimant more wages than lliiy other
employer.

AUTHORITY
i\.n employer may discharge a.Tl employee for any reason. However, only a discharge t.~at is found

to constitute misconduct for unemployment insurance purposes makes an employee ineligible for
benefits.
The employer must carry the burden of proving that the employee was discharged for
employment-related misconduct Parker vs. St. Maries Plvwood, 101 Idaho 415, 614 P.2d 955
(1980).
W-hile an employer may make almost any kind of rule for the conduct ofills employees and under
some circumstances may be able to discharge fu'1 employee for ....iolation of any rule, such does not,
perse, amount to 'misconduct' constituting a bar to unemployment compensation benefits .. Wroble
Ys.Bonners Fen-v R.fu'lQ:erStation. 97, Idaho 900, 556 P ?d 859 (1976).· . ..
.
.
Misconduct v.ithin the meaning of an unemployment compeP.sat1on act excluding from its benefit
an empioyee discharged for misconduct must be an act of wanton or willful disregard of the
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employer's interest, a deliberate violation of the employer's rules, a disregard of sta..'1dards of
behavior which the employer has the right to expect of his employee, or negligence in such degree
or recurrence as to manifest culpability, vlrongful intent, or evil design, or show an intentional and
substantial disregard of the employer's interest or of Lhe employee's duties and obligations to the
employer. Rasmussen vs. Employment Security Agencv, 83 Idaho 198, 360 P.2d 90 (1961).
Mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or
incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated ins'cances, or good faith errors in
judgment or discretion are not to be deemed "misconduct" Vl1thin the me3.L-TIng of the statute. Carter
VS. Emulovment Security COIDJUission, 364 Mich. 538, III N.W.2d 817 (1961).

In Big Butte Ranch. Inc. '{s. Grasmick:", 91 Idaho 6, 415 P .2d 48, (1966), the Idaho Supreme Court
held that "preponderance of evidence" ffie3.LLS such evidence as, when weighed with that opposed to
it, has more convincing force and from which it results that the greater probability of truth lies
therein. Accord Cook vs. \VesternField Seeds. Inc., at Idaho 675, 681, 429 P.2d 407, 413 (1967).
If a party has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence and the evidence presented
weighs evenly on both sides, the finder of fact must resolve the question against the party having the
burden of proof. Atlantic 3.ild Pacific Insurance Companv '{s. Barnes, 666 P.2d 163 (1983).
CO~CLUSIONS

AlthOUgi1. an employer may discharge an employee for aI1Y reason, the employer carries the burden
of illlb'i:rating by a preponderance of the evidence that the employee was discharged for
employment related misconduct before a claimant can be denied unemployment insurance benefits.
The Ida.1.o Supreme Cou..rt has defined misconduct as a willful, intentional disregard of the
employer's interest, a deliberate violation of the employer's rules, or a disregard from the standard
of behavlor which the employer has a right to expect or negligence in such a degree as to manifest
culpability, wrongful intent, or evil design. A "preponde;-ance of &1.e evidence" is evidence that,
when weighed with that opposed to it, has more convincing force and from which results a greater
probability of truth. If the evidence weighs eveniy on both sides, the issue must be decided against
the party bearing the burden of proof.
The employer discharged the daimant for violating their media policy. The Appeals Examiner
finds the employer's policy regarding media is vague
regards to Face Book. The claima.nt
does not mention the na..rne of the facility or the patient. The Appeals Examiner agrees with the
claima..nt that the employer overreacted.
Idaho Employment Security Law provides an isolated act or good faith error in judgment is not
considered misconduct. In this insta..l1ce, the claimant may have used pC/or judgment, aT)d made a
bad decision. However, the claimaI1t's actions do not ey..hibit the degree of willful disregard of an
employer's interest, or a deliberate violation of an employer's rule that would constitute
misconduct.
The Appeals Examinercoflcludes that it may havebe-v"11 h'1 the employer's best interest to discharge
L.~e claimant but they have not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the claimant was
discharged for misconduct in connection 'With employment The claimant is eligible for benefits.
The previous determination is reversed.
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~~<O-~
udge Shelton
Appeals Examiner

Date of Mailing

March

Last Day To Appeal

2013

April 10, 2013

APPEAL RIGHTS
You have FOURTEEN (14) DAYS FROM THE DATE OF MAJLlNG to file a \vritten appeal \\ith
the Idaho Industrial Commission. The appeal must be taken or mailed to:
Idaho Industrial Commission
Judicial Division, IDOL Appeals
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, lda.~o 83720-0041
In person:

Idaho Industrial Commission
700 S Cleaf\vater Lane
Boise Ida.~o 83712

Or transmitted by facsimile to (208) 332-7558 Attn: IDOL Appeals.

If the appeal is mailed, it must be postmarked no later than the last day to appeal. An appeal fiied
by facsimile transmission must be received by the Corn.rnisslon by 5:00 p.m., Mountain Time, on

the last day to appeal. A facsimile tr&"lSrrllssion received after 5:00 p.m. will be deemed received by
the Commission on the next business day. A late appeal will be dismissed. Appeals filed by any
means 'Wi::h the Appeals Bureau or an Idaho Department of Labor local office will not be accepted
by the Commission. TO EMPLOYERS f,VHO ARE IlVCORPORA.TED: !fyot/file an appeal wilh
the Idaho lndv..strial Commission, the appeal must be signed by a COlporate officer or legal counsel
licensed to practice in the State of Idaho and the signature must include the individual '5 title. The
Commission will not comider appeals submitted by empLoyer representatives who are not attOnk),S.
!fyou request a hearing before the Commission or permission La file a legal brief you must mak.e
these requests through legal counsel licensed to practice in the State of Jdaho. Questions sh..ould be
directed to the Idaho Industrial Commission, Unemployment Appeals, (208) 334-6024.

If no appeal is filed,t1:iisoecision will become final 3.1-1d cannot be char.ged. TO CL4Ll\1A. 1'·rr:
.
If
this decision is chaliged, a.'1y benefits paid will be subject to repayment. If an appeal is filed, you
should continue to report on your claim as long as you are unemployed,
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.-\PP EALS BUREAU
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
317 WEST MAIN STREET / BOISE, IDAcqO 83735-0720
(208) 332-3572 / (800) 621-4938
Ef0(: (208) 334-6440

CERTIFICA TE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on
March 27. 2013
, a true and
correct copy of Decision of Appeals Examiner was served by regular United States mai1 upon
each of the following:

JOSEPH E TALBOT
729 8TH AVE. N
BUHL ID 83316
DESERT VfEW CARE CENTER
820 SP~A,GUE ST
B1JHL ID 83316
ID BUREAU EDUCATlOKAJ. SERVICE
1450 MAIN STREET
GOODING ID 83330
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HEALTH
MANAGElV\ENT
Benevolent. Responsive. Professional.

1 10,
Commission
·on.IDOL

ldaho
P,O.
.se, Idaho
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RE: .Appeal of Joseph E. Talbot, Claimant,s. Desert View Care Center, Employer and
Idaho Department of Labor, and ID Bureau Educational Senices, Cost Reimbursement
Employer-Docket .\umber 30] 6-2013

A fA.CS1:vnLE 208-332-7558 ATT";: IDOL Appeals
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FAX (208) 233-4750
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COM.MISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
JOSE
SSN:

,
Claimant,

IDOL# 3016-2013

v.

DESERT VIEW CARE CENTER,
Employer,

NOTICE OF FILING
OF APPEAL

and

LE
ID BUREAU EDUCATIONAL SERVICE,
Cost Reimbursement Employer,
and
IDAHO DEPARTI\1ENT OF LABOR,

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE: The Industrial Commission has received an appeal from a
decision of an Appeals Examiner of the Idaho Department of Labor. A copy of the appeal is
enclosed, along with a copy of the Commission's Rules of Appellate Practice and Procedure.
PLEASE READ ALL THE RULES CAREFULLY
The Industrial Commission promptly processes all unemployment appeals in the order
received. In the mean time, you mav want to visit our web site for more information:
v.'Vv"vv.iic.idaho.Qo\'.
The Commission \vill make its decision in this appeal based on the record of the
proceedings before the Appeals EX<h'lliner of the Idaho Department of Labor.

INTIUSTRlAL COMMISSION
POST OFFICE BOX 83720
BOISE IDAHO 83720-0041
(208) 334-6024
Calls Received by the Industrial Commission May Be Recorded

NOTICE OF FILING OF APPEAL - 1
9

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the ~day of April, 2013 a true fu'1d correct copy of the Notice
of Filing of Appeal and compact disc of the Hearing was served by regular United States mail
upon the following:

APPEAL:
ID BUREAU EDUCATIONAL SERVICE
1450 MAIN STREET
GOODING, ID 83330
~!\PPEAL

AND DISC:

JOSEPH E. TALBOT
729 8TH AVE N.
BUHL, ID 83316
DESERT VIEW CARE CENTER
820 SPRAGUE ST.
BlJHL, ID 83316
DEPUTY ATTOR.cr-JEY GE1\TERAL
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

STATE HOUSE MAIL
317 W MAIN STREET
BOISE ID 83735

sb
Secretarv•
/ AssistanrlCommission
I !
L

NOTICE OF FILING OF APPEAL - 2
10

LA \VRENCE G. \VASDEN
ATTORNEY GEN'ERAL

CRldG G. BLEDSOE - ISB# 3431
TR:\CEY K. ROLFSEN - ISB# 4050
CHERYL GEORGE ISB# 4213
Deputy Attorneys General
Idaho Department of Labor
317 W. Main Street
Boise, Idaho 83735
Telephone: (208) 332-3570 ext. 3148

F' LE D
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL CO.MJvfISS10N OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
JOSEPH E. TALBOT,
Claimant,

)
)
)
)

vs.

)
)

DESERT V1E\\T CARE CENTER,

)

IDOL NO. 3016-2013

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE

)
~d

ID BuREAU EDUCATIONpl SERVICE,

)
)
)
)

Employers,
and

)

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,

)
)
)

---------------------------------TO THE ABOVE-NAI'v1ED PARTIES:

Please be advised that the undersigned Deputy Attorney General representing the
Idaho Department of Labor hereby enters the appearance of said attorneys as the
attorneys of record for the State of Idaho, Department of Labor, in the above-entitled
proceeding.

By statute, the Department of Labor is a party to all unemployment

insurance appeals in Idaho.
NOTICE OF APPEAR4.NCE - 1
11

DATED this

/9

ex-

day of ApriL 2013.

~~-----------\.

Deputy ArIom'ey General
Idaho Department of Labor

CERTIFICATE OF Iv1AILIKG

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEARANCE,
v"as mailed, postage prepaid, this _/___ day of ApriL 2013, to:
JOSEPH E. TALBOT
7298THAVEN
BlJHL, ID 83316
DESERT VIEW CARE CENTER
820 SPRA.GlTE ST
BUHL, ID 83316
ID BG'REAU EDUCATIOl\'iu~ SERVICE
1450 MAIN STREET
GOODING, ID 83330

NOTICE OF APPE.I\RAl\'CE - 2
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

JOSEPH E. TALBOT,
SSN:
Claimant,

IDOL # 3016-2013

v.

DECISION AND ORDER

DESERT VIEW CARE CENTER
Employer,
and

PI LED

ID BUREAU EDUCATIONAL SERVICE,
Cost Reimbursement Employer,

INDUSTRIAL

and
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR.

Appeal of a Decision issued by an Idaho Department of Labor Appeals Examiner finding
Claimant eligible for unemployment insurance benefits. REVERSED
Employer, Desert View Care Center, appeals

to

the Industrial Commission a Decision

issued by the Idaho Department of Labor ("IDOL" or "Department") ruling Claimant, Joseph E.
TalboL eligible for unemployment insurance benefits.

The Department's Appeals Exa.'11iner

concluded that Employer discharged Claimant for reasons other than misconduct cOlmected with
employment. Claimant and Employer participated in the Appeals Examiner's hearing. None of
the interested parties requests a new hearing before the Commission.

Nor does the record

indicate that the interests of justice require one.
The u..ndersigned Commissioners have conducted a de novo review of the record as
provided for in Idaho Code § 72-1368(7) and opinions issued by the Idaho Supreme Court.
Commission has relied on the audio recording of the hearing before the Appeals Examiner

DECISION AND ORDER - 1
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conducted on March 27, 2013, along with the exhibits [1 through 8] admitted into the record
during that proceeding.

FI~DINGS

OF FACT

Based on the evidence contained in the record, the Conm1ission concurs with and adopts
the Findings of Fact as set forth in the Appeals Examiner's Decision.
DISCUSSION
Employer discharged Claimant on February 2, 2013 for posting a derogatory and
threatening statement about a facility patient on F acebook.

(Audio recording).

The Idaho

Employment Security law provides unemployment insurance benefits to claimants who become
unemployed due to no fault of their O\\7n. In the case of a discharge, as was the cause for the
separation here, the issue is whether the claimant committed some fom1 of employment-related
misconduct that would render him or her ineligible for unemployment benefits pursuant to Idaho
Code § 1366(5). The burden of proving misconduct by a preponderance of the evidence falls
strictly on the employer. Appeals Examiner of Idaho Dept. of Labor v. lR. Simplot Co., 131
Idaho 318, 320, 955 P.2d 1097, 1099 (1998). If the discharging employer does not meet that
burden, benefits must be awarded to the claimant. ::..='-"'--'-'-='-'---'~'-'-===-:::~, 105 Idaho 22, 25,

665 P.2d721, 724 (1983);Parker v. S1. Maries Plywood, 101Idaho 415, 4L9, 614 P.ld 955, 959 .
(1980).
\\!nat constitutes "just cause" in the mind of an employer for dismissing an employee is
not the legal equivalent of "misconduct" under Idaho's Employment Security Law. The two
--~~~~i""'ss ueS·cn esepctrCtte-and

. digtinct...

::rher~.zfiether· th~-mployt'f··· had·

reasenable grounds

according to the employer's standards for dismissing a claimant is not controlling of the outcome
in these cases. Our only concern is whether the reasons for discharge constituted "misconduct"
DECISION AND ORDER - 2
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connected with the claimant's employment such that the claimant can be denied unemployment
benefits. Beaty v. City ofIdaho Falls, 110 Idaho 891, 892,719 P.2d 1151, 1152 (1986).
Claimant began working for Employer as a LPN on July 5, 2012.

After Claimant

finished his shift on January 3 L 2013, Claimant posted a statement on Facebook regarding a
patient of his indicating that he would "like to slap the eyer loying bat snot out of a patient who
is just being a jerk because they can .. .it makes me less motivated to make sure your call light
gets answered every time \vhen I moyv that the minute I step into the room I'll be greeted by a
deluge of insults." (Exhibit 4, p. 2). One of Claimant's Facebook friends \vas concerned about
the nature of the post and informed Employer of the post on February 1,2013. (Exhibit 4, p. 1).
Employer spoke with Claimant about the post when he arTived for his shift on February 2,2013.
Claimant indicated that he was just frustrated and was venting his frustration.

Employer

discharged Claimant at that time for posting a dero gatory and threatening statement about a
patient on Facebook in violation of Employer's social media policy. (Audio recording; Exhibit
3, pp. 2-4: Exhibit 5, p. 2).
The Idaho Supreme Court has established three grounds upon which to detennine
whether Claimant has engaged in "misconduct" as it applies to eligibility for unemployment
benefits.

Further, the Court requires the Commission to consider all three grounds in

determining \\'hether misconduct exists. Dietz v. I'v1inidoka County Higl1\\lav Dist., 127 Idaho
246, 248, 899 P.2d 956, 958 (1995).

We have carefullv considered all three Q:rounds for
J

~

detem1ining misconduct and conclude the issue can be disposed of under the "standards of
behavior" analysis without further unnecessary explanation of the other two grounds.
Under the "standards-of-behavior" analysis, the employer must sho\v by a preponderance
of the evidence that it communicated its expectations to the claimant or that its expectations

DECISION AND ORDER - 3
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"flowed normally" from the employment relationship. Further, the employer must demonstrate
that those expectations were objectively reasonable as applied to the claimant. As the Idaho
Supreme Court has pointed out. an "employer's expectations are ordinarily reasonable orJy
where they have been communicated to the employee." Folks

Y.

Moscow School District No.

129 Idaho 833, 838, 933 P.2d 642,647 (1997).
Notably, there is no requirement that the employer must demonstrate that the employee's
behavior was subjectively willful, intentional, or deliberate in his or her disregard of the
employer's expectations. Welch

Y.

Co\vles Publishim>: Co., 127 Idaho 361,364,900 P.2d 1372,

13 75 (1995). Because the employer need not demonstrate some form of "malice" on the part of
the employee, what communication did or did not take place betv;een the employer and the
claimant becomes a key element in these cases. An employee can only be held accoUl1table for
breaching those expectations that he or she understood, explicitly or implicitly, and was capable
of satisfying. Puckett Y. Idaho Department of Corrections, 107 Idaho 1022,695 P .2d 407 (1985).
Certainly, Employer had a reasonable expectation that Claimant would not make a
derogatory and/or threatening statement about a patient on Facebook.

Employer's policy

specifically prohibits any "slanderous, vulgar, obscene, intimidaling, threatening or other
'bullying' behavior electronically" towards facility stakeholders, including patients. (Exhibit 5,
-

p. 2). Although Claimant maintains that he had not read the "fine print" in the policy manual and
was not necessarily aware of this policy, he did acknowledge in Aus'Ust 2012 that he had read the
"Social and Electronic Media policy" and that he agreed to the requirements of that policy.
(Exhibit 5, p. 8).
Claimant maintains that he was only venting and that would never have acted in such a
ma.'1l1er despite his frustrations. (Audio recording). However, Claimant should have realized

DECISIO"K k ~D ORDER - 4

16

that posting such a comment on Facebook was inappropriate and that it \vould get back to
Employer. Employer had a reasonable expectation that ClaL.uant would not make derogatory
and/or threatening comments on Facebook about a patient. Even if Claimant had not received
any prior wamings regarding such behavior, he acknowledged that he was m:vare of Employer! :)
social media policy and should have realized that such comments were entirely inappropriate,
even if he \vas just "venting.

Employer discharged Claimant for employment-related

misconduct. Claimant is ineligible for unemployment benefits.
CONCLUSIOK OF LAW
Employer discharged Claimant for employment-related misconduct.
ORDER
The Decision of the Appeals Examiner is REVERSED and Claimant is ineligible for
unemployment bene11ts. This is a final order under Idaho Code § 72-1368(7).
DATED this It~dav
- . of

13.

IJ'\D US TRLAl CO MMI SSI02\

R.D. Maynard, Commissioner

ATTEST:

DECISIO~

Al'D ORDER - 5
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

-i!A day of ---I hereby certify that on the ~
\) UM.e: ,/
2013, a true and correct copy
of Decision and Order was served by regular United Stales mail upon each of the following:
JOSEPH E TALBOT
729 8TH AVE N
BUHL ID 83316
DESERT VIEW CARE CEKTER
820 SPRAGUE ST
BUHL ID 83316
ID BUREAU EDUCATIOKAL SERVICE
1450.\1AJ1, STREET
GOODING ID 83330
DEPUTY ATTORl,\EY GENERAL
IDl'illO DEP AR T!'v1ENT OF LABOR
STATE HOUSE ~MAIL
317 W MAIN STREET
BOISE ID 83735

DECISION AND ORDER - 6

Joseph Talbot •
June 23, 2013

729 8th Ave. N Buhl, Id 83316 •

(208) 944-2168
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Idaho Industrial Commission
Judicial Division, IDOL appeals
P.O. Box 83720-0041
Boise, Idaho 83720-0041

RE: Decision of appeal regarding unemployment benefits for Joseph E. Talbot vs. Desert View Care
Center and Idaho Department of labor.
Docket number 3016-2013
To whom it may concern:
Please consider this motion to reconsider the decision filed 6-10-13 to reverse unemployment insurance
eligibility in the above mentioned case. While I do not dispute that Desert View is free to employ who
they wish and that they were well within their rights to discharge me from their facility for the violation
in question, I do disagree that my behavior constituted willful misconduct or reasonable expectation of
behavior on my part as is required to deny unemployment benefits. As I understand it, the facility must
show a preponderance of evidence that their policy was communicated effectively and I do not believe
that this was accomplished. I present the following arguments in support of my claim:
1.) Since the commission chose to ignore in its decision the concept of willful misconduct I will
assume that they agree that the infraction in question was not willful in character or intent.
I'm glad that we agree on that and will try to refrain from mentioning this criteria again as it
has been decided in my favor.
2.) Regarding the idea of reasonable expectation, I respectfully disagree with your
interpretation of the matter at hand and offer the following as evidence.
th
a. In the recorded hearing that took place on March 27 , 2013 Judge Shelton asks my
former supervisor Stephanie Bishop "Had he received any warnings during his
employment" in reference to the social media policy violation. In her response she
stated "Two days prior to his termination I had given him a 30 day notice related to
his job performance, but that had nothing to do with his termination." As is the
case with most companies, their policy is to give warnings, and a 30 day notice for
most infractions, assumedly to provide a reasonable expectation that the employee
is aware of the policy before proceeding with termination.
b. Following the company's standard I would logically conclude that they willfully
ignored the requirement of a preponderance of evidence of reasonable expectation
when they chose to terminate me immediately without warning. Had this been a
HIPAA violation, or a direct threat absent of the mitigating trappings of sarcasm, I
__~~~_~~~~~~~----,-dooCQill1LundersJand tbatitwouldfJow naturally from thenatureoftheiob. and be a
reasonable expectation of conduct. It was neither of those therefore I disagree that
BRP has shown the required preponderance of evidence that there is a reasonable
expectation of conduct in regard to the Facebook post in question.
c. In my closing statement of the audio recording previously mentioned I reiterate that
! was under the impression because of a staff meeting where it was brought up, that

19

the policy in question was in regard to cell phone usage within the facilrty, and that
there was no mention of the extent to which our Facebook profiles could be
scrutinized. That was my understanding of the policy as stated under oath with my
former supervisor listening. When Judge Shelton asked if there was any rebuttal
the answer was one simple word; "No,"
d. In the Commission's decision it states that I "should have realized that posting such
a comment on Facebook was inappropriate and that it would get back to the
employer." The Commission did not address that the facility representative was
given an opportunity to state that the policy was communicated dearly to the staff
contrary to my accusation that it had not been and they chose not to. The
Commission states as well that I "acknowledged that [I] was aware of the social
media policy," but fails to address that I was not aware that it covered Facebook
postings of the kind in question, an assertion undisputed by the facility
representatives, as stated in sworn testimony.
e. Desert View Care Center has asserted that my posting was "more than a 'good faith
error in judgment'" (See notice of appeal to Idaho Industrial Commission filed by BRP
h
health management on April 10t , 2013 page 1). They go on to accuse me of
"intimidating, threatening, or ... bullying behavior ... towards facility stakeholders." I
was not threatening anyone. If the statement in question is dissected and essential
pieces of grammar removed, then it sounds more threatening that it was meant to.
For example; the Commission's decision filed on 6-10-13 quotes the post as "like to
slap the ever loving bat snot out of a patient who is being a jerk just because they
can." The actual post begins with "Have you ever had one of those nights where ... "
a commonly used phrase that makes a sentence rhetorical. it is specifically used in
this instance to convey to the reader that the question is not based on actual desire,
and that choice of words was used merely to demonstrate the level of frustration I
was feeling at the moment. If you read the rest of the posting you will see how the
rea! intent is clarified, and my actual feelings are expressed free of sarcasm. "It
makes me less motivated to make sure that your cal! light gets answered every time
when I know that the minute I step into the room I will be greeted with a deluge of
insults." Taken in context the second half of the comment negates the severity of
the first, further evidence that it was rhetorical.
f. Desert View Care Center and BRP have overreacted to this event from the
beginning. I would like to cite as an example exhibit #3 page 3 where the facility
asserts the following as a resultof myposting. "We losetrustofthecommunity and.
partners. The nurse instructor could choose to no longer use our facility; our image
was affected by his actions. Patients families could be offended and lose trust in us,
his posting sounded very aggressive and the clmt most likely lose his license due to
his behavior." None of this happened or was even remotely plausible. They are
sure to keep the cooperation of CSI nursing instructors, especially since they employ
one of their daughters as a nurse before she's even graduated from nursing school.
The only image that was damaged was the public's view of how Desert View treats it
_ _~~~~~~~~~~~~e~m,+,ployees, andnotoolyd;iicLLnot lose myliceose;! received absolutely Qo·pt!Qitive
measures from the Idaho Board of Nursing. They too considered it a lapse in
judgment and simply cautioned me in a letter not to use that type of language
again.
3.) Conclusion:

20

a.

b.

c.

I was under the impression that the policy in question was in reference to cell phone
usage, not Facebook, an assertion that was not disputed by the facility
representatives when given the opportunity in sworn testimony.
As stated in the commission's decision on page 4 "an employer's expectations are
ordinarily reasonable only where they have been communicated to the employee."
i. As I have just shown, they employer admitted in sworn testimony by
negative affirmation of my description of the delivery of the policy in a
group setting that it was not communicated effectively.
ii. This should show that the employer did not meet the preponderance of
evidence requirement to disqualify an employee for benefits.
iii. If that is not the case, then it is at least a tie. They have miniscule
expectation through a signed piece of paper. I have what I consider
overwhelming evidence through sworn testimony of BRP representatives
confirming that they did not fully explain their expectations. How is it that
the commission ruled in favor of the employer when according to the
original decision by Judge Shelton on page 3 it states "If a party has the
burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence and the evidence
presented weighs evenly on both sides, the finder of fact must resolve the
question against the party having the burden of proof. Atlantic and Pacific
Insurance Company vs. Barnes, 666 P.2d 163 (1983)?"
From my perspective it appears that the Commission did not address these matters
in their decision, and I am requesting that they do so.

In closing I wish to appeal to your humanity. The last year has been a professional death spiral for me.
have failed to complete RN school twice. With student loans and personal debts mounting I found
myself filing bankruptcy at the beginning of the year, and then! lost my job. The destruction of my
reputation and professional resume were so complete that it was late May before I found work, and I
only recently was told I could work full time soon. I am returning to school in the fall to study English,
hoping to change careers and put all this behind me. We have had 2 vehicles repossessed and barely
managed to keep our home. In addition, I found out on the same day that I was fired that my wife is
expecting our 4th child. Although I am elated beyond measure my joy is tempered by the fact that I
simply cannot afford to pay back over 4,000 dollars in employment. I implore you; please don1t make
the same mistake Desert View has. I am a threat to none, except maybe a rack of ribs or a jelly donut.
have never willfully disregarded any rules to which I have submitted myself, and I have always been a
proponent of the rule of law. I know for a fact that what I said was not meant to cause harm,but to
stimulate discussion. ! ask you to believe me, and apply that belief to the legal standards of
preponderance of evidence and reasonable expectation, of which there was none. Thank you for your
reconsideration of this matter.

)lk1pectf~7
IlApr~:~-~j"6seph Talbot
---~~-'---I(fl'\INot~

I did not4&eivaa-Uansctipt-ofthe-audio4:&or-ding..nouJo-lbelievecOne-wa~r-eate-drthe+e-tor-e,--,-~~~~
I do not reference specific pages when I quote from the audio recording. This is allowed according to
Rule 5 section D of Rules of APPElLATE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE UNDER THE IDAHO EMPLOYMENT
SECURITY LAW. Where possible I have referenced the document I draw information from to the best
of my abilities.)
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BEFORE THE L7>,TDUSTRIAL COMMISSIO.K OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
JOSEPH E. TALBOT,
Claimant,

IDOL # 3016-2013

v.

DESERT VIEW CARE CENTER,
Employer,
ID BlJREAU EDUCA TlONAL SERJYCE,

Fl LED

Employer,
and
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the l?"f4 day of June, 2013, a true and correct copy of
Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration was served by regular United States mail upon each of
the following:

DESERT VIEW CARE CENTER
820 SPRAGUE ST.
B1.JHL ID 83316
ID B1.JTREAU EDUCATIONAL SERVICE
1450 Iv1AIN STREET
GOODING ID 83330
DEPUTY ATTOR.NEY GENER.Al
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

STATE HOUSE M4IL
317 W MAIN STREET
BOISE ID 83735

kh
cc:

JOSEPH E. TALBOT
7298THAVEN
B1JHL ID 83316
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BEFORE THE IlXDUSTRIAL COIVIMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

JOSEPH E. TALBOT,
Claimant

IDOL # 3016-2013
ORDER DENYING
RECONSIDER4.TION

v.

DESERT VIE\V CARE CENTER,
Employer,
and
ID BuREAU EDUCATIONAL SERVICE,
Cost Reimbursement Employer,

FLED

and
IDlillO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR.

Request for reconsideration of a decision from the Industrial Commission finding
Claimant ineligible for unemployment benefits. The request for reconsideration is DE-VIED.

The above-entitled matter is pending before the Industrial Commission on Claimant's
request for reconsideration filed June 26,2013. Idaho Code § 72-1368(7).
Claimant is seeking reconsideration of the Industrial Commission's Decision and Order
filed on June 10,2013. The Commission reversed the Decision issued by an Appeals Examiner
with the Idaho Depac'1ment of Labor. The COlThllission conducted a de novo review of the record

Claimant worked for Employer as a LPN for approximately seven months.

After

ORDER DENYING RECONSIDERi\TION- 1
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Claimant finished his shift on January 31, 2013, Claimant posted a statement on F ace book which
stated, "Ever have one of those days where you'd like to slap the ever loving bat snot out of a
patient who is just being a jerk because they can? Nurses shouldn't have to take abuse from you
just because you are sick. Ll1 fact, it makes me less motivated to make sure your call light gets
answered every time when I Lrow that the minute I step into the room I'll be greeted with a
deluge of insults." (Exhibit 4, p. 2.) One of Claimant's Facebook friends \vas concerned about
the nature of the post and informed Employer of the post on February 2, 2013.

Claimant

indicated that he was simply venting [tis frustration. Employer discharged Claimant for posting a
derogatory and threatening statement about a patient on Facebook in violation of Employer's
social media policy.
The Commission found that under the standards of behavior analysis, Employer
established that Employer communicated it standard and Claimant's conduct fell below the
expected standard.
Motions for reconsiderations are intended to allow the Commission

atl

opportunity to

reexamine its decision in light of additional legal arguments, a change in law, a misinterpretation
of law, or an argument or aspect of the case that was overlooked. Rules of Appellate Practice
and Procedure 8 (F).
In the motion to reconsider, Claimant argues that the policy was not communicated

effectively to him because in the staff meeting \vhere the policy was discussed the specific usage
noted was cell phones. Claimant states that he was unaware of the extent to wftich his Facebook
profile could be scrutinized. Claimant further avers that, read in its entirety, his Facebook post is
a rhetorical expression of frustration.

ORDER DENYING RECONSIDERATION- 2
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First, the policy which was given to Claimant, discussed at a staff meeting, and then
acknowledged by Claimant's signature, clearly states that it is not limited to a variety of social
media outlets including Facebook. Regardless of whether or how the information got back to
Employer, avoiding such conduct was communicated to Claimant as being the reasonable
standard of behavior at Employer's business.
Further, the Facebook post in question is stated in full above, and the COlllillission
maintains that such a post is in violation of Employer's stac'1dard of behavior. Talk of slapping a
sick patient on Facebook is clearly a violation of the standard of electronically intimidating,
threatening, or bullying behavior tm:vards a facility stakeholder.
Claimant has not presented any further argument on the issues related to the Decision and
Order which would persuade the Commission to alter its ruling. The Commission finds no
reason to disturb the Decision and Order in tbis matter.
Based upon the foregoing reasons, the Claimant's request for reconsideration is hereby
DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED tins

!O~day of_-'----="'-J..--'-;----_ __

13.

INDUSTRIAL CO:MMISSION

R.D. Maynard, Commissioner

ORDER DE:Nl'ING RECONSIDERATION· 3
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· SSlstant CommiSSion Secretary

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

,~

I hereby certifY that on IOilaayof
foregoing ORDER DENYING RECONSIDERA
upon each of the following:

2013, a true and "meet copy of the
ON was served by regular United States mail

JOSEPH E TALBOT
729 8TH AVEN
BUHL ID 83316
DESERT VIEW CARE CENTER
820 SPRAGUE ST
BUHL ID 83316
ID BUREAU EDUCATIONAL SERVICE
1450 MAIN STREET
GOODING ID 83330
DEPUTY ATTOR.Ncy GENERAL
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

STATE HOUSE ]v[A1L
317 W MAIN STREET
BOISE ID 83735

Kh

ORDER DE:N"YING RECOKSIDERATION- 4

/F;

Appellant Filing Pro Se -Joseph E. Talbot
729 Sll> Ave. N.
BuhI., Id 83316

ZGI)
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(208)944-2168

BEFORE THE SUPRE1\1E COURT OF THE STATE OF ID.iliO

Joseph E. Talbot-Appellant
V.

Case No. _3016-2013
NOTICE OF APPEAL

Desert View Care Center, employer
and
ID Bureau Educational Service,
cost reimbursement Employer
and
Idaho Department of Labor,
and
Idaho Industrial Commission

TO: TI:IE ABOVE NA.M.ED RESPONDEhl'fS, AND THE PARTY'S ATTORf.."EYS, AND
idE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS BEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1. The above named appellant Joseph Talbot, appeals against
above-named
respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Idaho Industrial Commission Decision and
Order entered in the above-entitled action on the 10th day of June Chairman Thomas P. Baskin
presiding.
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgments or
orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule [e.g.
(1 1(a)(2)) or (12(a))] I.AR3. I v.rish to address the following issues in my appeal.
The Idaho Industrial Commission chose to address only one of the requirements that
the Idaho Supreme Court has established to determine ineligibility for benefits in th~.r
decision. I will focus on that analysis, namely the "standards of behavior," grounds in

27

dt-aWillg my conclusions, in the hopes that dispwving this argument w& show that I
was granted. unemployment benefits correctly and that I should not be forced to repay
them as ordered.
1. In their decison the Con:n:nission asserts that I ack:nowiedged the facility's policy

in question when I signed the form on page 8 of exlnbit 5.

a \\!hen I was hired by BRP in August of 2012 they were in an extreme
hurry to place me on the floor with the residents. As a result I was given Yz
day of orientation on each of the !\Vo halls and virtually no formal training

in the policies and procedures of the facility. I did not know in advance
that they would be p1aci.ng vital docu.ments in our paycheck

b. BRP pays its employees in the follov.ring manner; on a designated pay

day all employees are obligated to arrive at the facility at the same time and
form a line outside the conference room. They are then funneled through
that room as fast as possible and given their paychecks, then told to
the 6 months

I was employed at BRP never

was it mentioned to me at any time that I would also be signing for vital
policies and procedures, nor was I shown the fine print at the top of the
page or given the time to peruse the document I was signing. I will site
evidence from the audio recording to substantiate this claim in the brief

c. A signature obtained under these circumstances is practically null and
void in real world application, even if the law finds it valid. That, along
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v.ith cost savings of not majil1'ig checks or providing direct deposit, is why
BRP engages in this kind of underhanded technique,

2. The Commission claims that my employer had a reasonable expectation that I
not make "derogatory andlor threatening statement(s) aboLJt a patient on
Facebook" (Decision and Order page 4) I disagree that the intention of me
statements in question was to be either threatening or derogatory in nature and
believe that the corrunission is merely agreeing in opinion With the facility, not in
factual basis according to the law.

a. My h'1tention when writing the post in question was to stimulate
discussion among my peers, not to UCIlWJle or harm anyone. Nursing is an
emotionally drair-ring profession and it helps to talk about it with those who
know

I wrote the post for the sole purpose of instigating such a

discussion, I was very careful not to implicate anyone directly or to violate
nursing practice by breaking HIPPA protocol. This was my understanding
of the rules at

time.

b. Careful analysis of the grammar in the posting will show that it was
rhetorical in rurture and designed to provide levity in a difficult
conversation. The facility's policy does not prohibit rhetoric or satire,
that BRP and the Industrial

Commission are not in possession of a sense of humor, or that they cannot
understand rhetorical satire when it presents itself I suggest they broaden
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their menu of literature and lea..rn to

something besides legal briefs or

policies and procedures.
3. The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, the very first

thLTlg our founders saw fit to enshrine in our collective consciousness, included the
provision of free speech for ali citizens. If the government of the United States
"shall make no law ... abridging the .freedom of speech." Then how is it ok for BRP

to make a policy that does exactly that? I have a right to use satire and rhetoric in
public, and they have no right to prohibit that. The application of this policy
towards anything that the facility deems inappropriate is a major restriction of my
fr~.Aom

of speech. Had this been an actual

meaning a sr..atement of

interrJon to do hlL.'11l free of rhetoric and satire, then I could see where the policy
would apply. If this is allowed to stand then employers could in

future

discharge employees for a myriad of opinions at their whiln and pleasure. I did not
mention their facility, I did not mention a
carmot prove

one of their reS:lUeJES, and they

the stateJnellt in question involved them in any way. It was my

bUsh'1ess, it was my conversation, and they

no right to

""t;;,.ua.,-",

it outside of

their fadJity.

4. BRP has demonstrated a consistent tendency to apply their policies selectively.
a. Two weeks before I was discharged I was called from my work station

asked what had happened to the other nurse she stated that because of the
nurse's behavior and overall aggressive tone regarding Ii difficult patient
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she had been forced to send her home. She s--cated at that tilDe that she feit
t.~e

nurse in question posed enough of a "threat" to the safety of the

residents, either directly or indirectly, that it was warranted sending her
home. The nurse in question was later allowed to return to the facility -with
absolutely no punitive actions taken. This was an actual threat to the
residents, one serious enough to ask a nurse to leave the building, not one

assumed from a rhetorical statement, and the facility's response was in
effect, «no big deal."
b. This kind of favoritism is common -with desert view, and seems to be
based more in gender than lh"1ything else.
discharged from the facility around

were three nurses

same time as myself, two males and

one female. The female told me in a later conversation that they were kind
to her and that they would not dispme her unemployment, and

been living for months on

generous

had

I also spoke 'With the

other male nurse fired at that time and he experienced the same aggressive
attack as me. Tne facility de,."1ied

DeIlenrs and accused

of serious

infractions. There is also the matter of the previous DNS before Stepr..ame
Bishop. She was known to frequently swear and yell at staff members and

engaged in routine ha..rassment of staff member, -with the :full knowledge
and approval of her superiors. This is anecdotal evidence at best, but I
treatment that male nurses are

subjected to in this field on a daily basis, and expected to tolerate.
Members of the girls only club get a pass, outsiders be damned.

31

4. Has an order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record? NO
5.(a) Is a reporters transcript requested?

NO

6. The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's (agency's)
record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, lAR.
Solely those documents and evidence already a part of the above mentioned case.
7. I certify:

(a) that a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom a transcript has
been requested as named below at the address set out below:
Name and
Name and
Name and ll!f'lrlrp.(l<::
----~---------------------------------------------(b) (1) [ ] That the clerk
court or aClIJOlDlstra.t:lVe agency has
paid the estimated
fee for preparation of the reporters traP..script.
(2) [ ] That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated transcript fee because _ __

(c) (1) [ ] That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's or agency's record

been paid.

(2)' [ ] That appellant is exempt from paying the esti.mated fee for preparation of the record
_________________________________________________________

b~~use

(d) (1)

[~ tbe appellate filirig fee has been paid ~~

(2) [ ] That appellant is exempt from paying the appellate filing fee because _ _ _ __

(e) That se"'Vice has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20 (and the
attorney general ofIdaho pursuant to § 67-1401(1), Idaho Code).
TIllS

20
Is/Attorney's Signature
(Name of Attorney or Firm for Appellant)

Attorneys for the Appellant

('When certification is made by a party instead of the party's attome"Y the folloVv1ng affidavit must
be executed pursuant to tAR Rule 17(i))
State ofIdaho

County of _Twin Falls

)
) ss.
)

JQseph E. Talbot
, being sworn, deposes and says:
Th.a1 the party is the appellant in the above-entitled appeal, and that all statements in this
notice of appeal are true and correct to the best of~er knowledge and belief
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Title
Residence

BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
JOSEPH E. TALBOT,
Claimant!Appellant,

SUPREME COURT NO.

Lj/J ()J

v

DESERT VIE\V CARE CENTER,

CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL
OFJOSEPH TALBOT

Employer/Respondent,
and
ID BUREAU EDUCATIOKAL SERVICE,
Cost Reimbursement
Employer/Respondent,

FI LE

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
Respondent.

Appeal From:

Industrial Commission Chairman Thomas P. Baskin presiding.

Case Number:

IDOL # 3016-2013

Order Appealed from:

DECISION AND ORDER ENTERED JlJNE 10, 2013 A~D
ORDER DENYING RECONSIDERA nON ENTERED JULY 10,
2013

Representative/Claimant:

Joseph E. Talbot
729 8th AYe.
Buhl,ID 83316

Representative/Employers:

Desert Vie\\' Care Center
820 Sprague St.
Buhl,ID 83316
ID Bureau Educational Service
Gooding,ID 83330

CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL OF JOSEPH E. TALBOT - 1

Representative/IDOL:

Tracey K. Rolfsen
Idaho Depa.rtment of Labor
317 W. Main St.
Boise, ID 83735

Appealed By:

Joseph E. Talbot, Claimant/Appellant

Appealed Against:

Desert View Care Center, ID Bureau Educational Service,
and IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR/Respondents

Notice of Appeal Filed:

July 10,2013

Appellate Fee Paid:

A check for the incorrect amount was received and returned to
Claimant/Appellant (See attached copy of letter).

Name of Reporter:

M. Dean Willis
PO Box 1241
Eagle, ID 83616

Transcript:

Transcript ordered

Dated:

July 12, 2013

CERTIFICATE OF A.PPEAL OF JOSEPH E. TALBOT - 2

CERTIFICATIO~

I, Kim Helmandollar, the undersigned AssistcLTll Commission Secreta.r.' of the Industrial
Commission of the State of Id3-ho, hereby CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and correct
photocopy of the

~otice

of Appeal filed July 10,2013; Decision and Order filed June 10,2013;

and Order Denying Reconsideration filed July 10, 2013: and the whole thereof Docket
~LLrnber

3016-2013 for Joseph E. Talbot.

D\ Vv1ThtSS 'IV}[EREOF, I have hereunto set my h3-Tld and aftJxed the official seal of
. , C OIILT1llSSlOn
. . t hi s _1""_
1.di day

sma

f

--""'-'~-=+----'

~c

2013.

4 ..~ii_;

-

c, \-. ' ..

Rim Helmandollar'
" .. '
.A~ssistant Commission Secretary
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CERTIFICATIO~

OF RECORD

I, Kim Helmandollar, the undersigned Assistant Commission Secretary of the Industrial
Cornmission, do hereby certify that the foregoing record contains true and correct copies of all
pleadings, documents, and papers designated to be included in the Agency's Record on appeal by
Rule 28(3) of the Idaho Appellate Rules and by the Notice of AppeaL pursuant to the provisions
of Rule 28(b).
I further certify that all exhibits admitted in this proceeding are correctly listed in the List

of Exhibits (i). Said exhibits will be lodged \vith the Supreme Court after the Record is settled.
1 fA
DATED this ,.(()
day of

2013.

CERTIFICATION OF RECORD - (JOSEPH E. L<\LBOT SC#41208)-1

:::p

~I

BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDABO
JOSEPH E. TALBOT,
Claimant/Appellant,

SUPRE~ME COl~T

NO. 41208

v.

DESERT VIE\V CARE CENTER,
Employer/Respondent,
OF COI".'fPLETION
and
ID BUREAU EDUCATIONAL SERVICE,
Cost Reimbursement
Employer/Respondent,
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
Respondent.

TO:

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk of the Courts; and
Joseph Talbot, Pro Se, Claimant/Appellant; and
Desert View Care Center, Employer/Respondent: and
ID Bureau Educational Service, Cost Reimbursement Employer/Respondent; and
Tracey K. Rolfsen, Esq., for Idaho Department of Labor/Respondent.

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that the Agency's Record was completed on tl:Jis date,
and, pursuailt toRule 24(a) and Rule 27(a), Idaho Appellate Rules, copies

the same have been

served by regular U.S. mail upon each of the following:
Address For Claimant/Appellant:

Joseph E. Talbot
729 8th Ave.

NOTICE OF COMPLETION (JOSEPH E TALBOT, SC # 41208) - 1
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Address for EmployerslRespondents:
Desert Vie\y Care Center
820 Sprague St.
Buhl, ID 83316
ID Bureau Educational Service
1450 Main Street
Gooding, ID 83330
Address For Respondent:
Tracey K. Rolfsen
Deputy Attorney General
317 \V. Main Street
Boise, ID 83735
You are further notified that. pursuant to Rule 29(a), Idaho Appellate Rules, all
pariies haw twenty-eight days from this date in which to file objections to the Record,
including requests for corrections, additions or deletions.

In the event no objections to the

Agency's Record are filed within the nventy-eight day period, the Transcript and Record
shall be deemed settled.
DATED at Boise, Idaho this ~-=--_day of--L-44.-'?£A...,;;zL._ _ ' 2013.
INDUSTRIAL COl'vlMISSION

Assistant Commission Secretary

l'OTICE OF COMPLETION (JOSEPH E TALBOT, SC # 41208) - 2
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